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Commentary
Christina D. Romer
to-day details of policymaking has caused him to
fail to stress the more fundamental determinants
of policy mistakes in this era. In the 1960s and
1970s, it was not that the Federal Reserve was
narrowly constrained by fiscal policy. Rather, both
monetary and fiscal policymakers were con-
strained or driven by the misguided economic
framework of the time.
IN DEFENSE OF THE IDEAS
HYPOTHESIS
The view that economic ideas were the key
source of the Great Inflation, and indeed most of
the policy failures and successes of the postwar
era, is one that my coauthor, David Romer, and I
documented in a series of papers (see Romer and
Romer, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). It is, as Meltzer notes,
a view with many proponents, especially for the
Great Inflation. Taylor (1997, 1999), Sargent (1999),
De Long (1997), Mayer (1998), Orphanides (2003),
Nelson (2004a,b), and Nelson and Nikolov (2004)
have all provided evidence on the central role of
economic beliefs. Since Meltzer argues that beliefs
were only a small part of the story, I thought it
would be useful to discuss the evidence for this
alternative briefly and to answer some of Meltzer’s
challenges. I will then go on to discuss what parts
of Meltzer’s politics hypothesis I think are persua-
sive and what parts I feel are not.
In our papers, David Romer and I use much
the same sources and techniques as Meltzer. We
show the crucial role of ideas by reading the
narrative record. We find that monetary and fiscal
policymakers’ economic views evolved drastically
over time and that these views played a crucial
role in the actions they took. In our analysis, the
T
he Great Inflation of the late 1960s and
1970s was surely one of the defining
moments of postwar economic history.
After more than a decade of stable
prices and relatively steady real growth, the
United States, and indeed the world economy,
embarked on a path of steadily rising inflation.
By the end of the 1970s, inflation had reached
levels unheard of in peacetime. Understanding
the origins of the Great Inflation is a crucial task
for modern economists and policymakers. Only
by understanding how we went so far astray in
the 1960s and 1970s can we be confident of
avoiding the same fate in the future.
In his paper, Allan Meltzer provides his usual
mix of probing insight and detailed narrative
history. Meltzer makes several arguments about
the factors giving rise to the Great Inflation. Some
of them I agree with; some of them I do not. But,
as is always true of his work, I learned a great deal.
Meltzer’s key theme is that politics were cru-
cial. The Great Inflation began and continued
largely because monetary policymakers felt con-
strained to accommodate expansionary fiscal
actions. More generally, monetary policymakers
felt they needed to support the administration’s
and Congress’s desire for low unemployment
above all else. Added to this main idea, Meltzer
stresses the impact of operating procedures. The
need to maintain an “even-keel” during debt
issues and an excessively short-run focus in
monetary policymaking made concerted anti-
inflation policy difficult.
There is surely truth in Meltzer’s politics
hypothesis, especially for the late 1960s. But over-
all, I feel that Meltzer’s analysis is too narrow. I
believe that his painstaking analysis of the day-
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© 2005, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.Great Inflation resulted from the replacement of
the remarkably sensible economic framework of
the 1950s with the fundamentally misguided
framework of the 1960s. The inflation persisted
throughout the 1970s because policymakers
replaced one bad model of the economy with
another.
Let me give a brief sense of the evolution of
economic beliefs. (Table 1 summarizes this evo-
lution.) In contrast to Meltzer, who views 1950s
policymakers as largely rudderless, we find that
policymakers in this decade had a basically sound,
if relatively unsophisticated, view of how the
economy functioned. They believed that inflation
resulted when output went above a quite reason-
able view of capacity or full employment. They
also believed that, while expansionary policy
could reduce unemployment below normal in the
short run, the resulting inflation would certainly
not lower unemployment permanently and might
possibly raise it. For example, Federal Reserve
Chairman William McChesney Martin said in
1958: “If inflation should begin to develop again,
it might be that the number of unemployed would
be temporarily reduced…but there would be a
larger amount of unemployment for a long time
to come” (Federal Open Market Committee
[FOMC], Minutes, August 19, 1958, p. 57).
Because of these views, both monetary and fiscal
policy were carefully tempered in the 1950s. On
a number of occasions the Federal Reserve
responded to rising inflation by orchestrating
serious contraction.
In the 1960s, policymakers clearly adopted a
different model. Estimates of a “reasonable and
prudent” goal for normal unemployment were
substantially reduced by the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations and by the Federal Reserve
(Council of Economic Advisers, 1962, p. 46). And,
as has been stressed by a number of scholars, a
belief in a permanent trade-off between inflation
and unemployment briefly held sway. These views
led to highly expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies, and inflation and booming real growth
resulted.
Around 1970, policymakers adopted a natural
rate framework, but with an overly optimistic
estimate of the natural rate. This view led to a
half-hearted attempt at disinflation in 1969 and
1970. The result was that inflation was temporarily
slowed, but not squelched.
Early in his tenure as Federal Reserve Chair-
man, Arthur Burns added the idea that inflation
was relatively insensitive to slack. He concluded
that “monetary policy could do very little to arrest
an inflation that rested so heavily on wage-cost
pressures. In his judgment a much higher rate of
unemployment produced by monetary policy
would not moderate such pressures appreciably”
(FOMC, Minutes, June 8, 1971, p. 51). If tight mone-
tary policy and the resulting unemployment were
ineffective against inflation, there was no reason to
pursue it. Because of this view, the Federal Reserve
and the Nixon administration ran expansionary
macroeconomic policy and advocated dealing
with inflation through wage and price controls.
Economic views became substantially more
sensible in the mid-1970s and, again, disinflation
was attempted. Inflation fell substantially after the
1973-75 recession. However, with the election of
Jimmy Carter and the appointment of G. William
Miller as Federal Reserve Chairman, estimates of
the natural rate were lowered and Burns’s view
that inflation was insensitive to slack returned
with a vengeance. The first Carter Economic Report
of the President stated: “Recent experience has
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Table 1
Characteristics of Policymakers’ Economic
Framework in Different Eras
1950s Inflation (π) caused by output above 
capacity.
Normal unemployment (u) moderate.
No permanent π-u trade-off.
1960s Normal u low. 
Permanent π-u trade-off.
Early 1970s Natural rate framework with low 
natural rate of unemployment (u –).
π insensitive to slack.
Mid-1970s Natural rate framework with 
moderate u –.
π responds somewhat to slack.
Late 1970s Natural rate framework with low u –.
π insensitive to slack.
 demonstrated that the inflation we have inherited
from the past cannot be cured by policies that slow
growth and keep unemployment high” (Council
of Economic Advisers, 1978, p. 17). The result was
fiscal expansion and monetary policy inaction
in the face of high and rising inflation.
This brief description of the “ideas view” of
the Great Inflation points out a number of impor-
tant elements. One is the notion of change. A cru-
cial part of any explanation of the Great Inflation
must be to show what changed in the 1960s that
led the price stability of the 1950s to be replaced
by persistent inflation. Our research, along with
that of a number of other scholars, clearly shows
that the economic framework took a radical turn.
This same notion of change explains why the
policy mistakes were so persistent. Meltzer gives
as one reason that he rejects the central role of
ideas that it is implausible that bad ideas would
have lasted 15 years in the face of the obvious
continued rise in inflation. But, as we show, policy-
makers did learn. The Samuelson-Solow perma-
nent trade-off view was rejected at the start of the
Nixon administration. However, it was replaced
by another flawed model: first by a natural rate
framework with a very low natural rate, then by a
natural rate framework with an extreme insensitiv-
ity of inflation to slack. It was this succession of
misguided models that gave rise to repeated policy
mistakes and persistent inflation in this period. 
Here I should mention the very nice recent
paper by Georgio Primiceri. Primiceri (2004)
develops and estimates a model of learning for
the 1960s on. He finds that this evolution of ideas
that we think was crucial could have resulted from
policymakers updating their framework along
plausible dimensions in response to the macro-
economic developments in this period. For exam-
ple, Primiceri finds that Burns’s conclusion that
inflation was insensitive to slack was a plausible
way to revise the natural rate model given policy-
makers’ priors and the inflation news of the time.
A second important element is the key role
of ideas for both monetary and fiscal policy. The
economic beliefs of policymakers in different parts
of the government show close correlation over the
entire postwar era. That both monetary and fiscal
policy were expansionary in the late 1960s and
1970s does not mean that the Federal Reserve felt
forced to accommodate fiscal policy. Rather, the
two types of policymakers shared similar views
about the sustainable level of unemployment and
the ability of aggregate demand restriction to cure
inflation.
The description also suggests how some other
recent research fits into the ideas story. Athanasios
Orphanides (2003) emphasizes errors in the meas-
urement of the output gap as a source of policy
mistakes in the 1960s and 1970s. But, misestimates
of the output gap are not random or due to tech-
nical difficulties. They are fundamentally due to
a flawed model of the economy. The belief in a
permanent trade-off, along with data from the low-
inflation environment of earlier decades, led
policymakers in the 1960s to choose 4 percent as
their goal for unemployment. A belief that infla-
tion had become insensitive to slack allowed them
to maintain this flawed view in the early and late
1970s despite rapidly rising inflation.
Edward Nelson (2004a,b, and Nelson and
Nikolov, 2004) emphasizes what he calls the mone-
tary neglect hypothesis as the source of the Great
Inflation. This hypothesis holds that policymakers
attributed inflation to supply-side factors and did
not believe that monetary restraint could cure the
resulting inflation. In our view, the emphasis on
special factors was a symptom of policymakers’
other misguided beliefs, such as an overly opti-
mistic estimate of the natural rate: They had to
invoke other factors because they did not believe
demand was excessive. Moreover, the belief that
monetary contraction was useless was the funda-
mental part of the neglect hypothesis. Even if the
inflation had been caused by special factors, with-
out the pessimism about the usefulness of slack,
the obvious response would have been monetary
contraction. We agree strongly with Nelson that
this pessimism was the crucial source of policy
inaction at key points in the 1970s.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
OF THE POLITICS HYPOTHESIS
Now that I have shamefully digressed and
given my own view of where the Great Inflation
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view that politics were crucial. It is a view that I
believe has some strengths, but also some impor-
tant weaknesses.
Perhaps its most fundamental weakness is that
it is too narrowly focused on the Federal Reserve.
Suppose that Meltzer is completely right that the
Federal Reserve felt constrained to support various
administrations’ expansionary fiscal policies.
This story only pushes the mystery of the Great
Inflation back a step. One is left to ask, Where did
the drive for expansionary fiscal policy come
from? Here, I believe, even Meltzer would assign
a large role to ideas. Herbert Stein’s classic book
The Fiscal Revolution in America (1969) details
the crucial role of economic beliefs in breaking
down the traditional support for a balanced
budget. And, as I have described, the changing
beliefs among policymakers about the sustain-
able level of unemployment and the efficacy of
recession for controlling inflation can explain
why policymakers genuinely concerned about
inflation could nevertheless have advocated fiscal
expansion.
In terms of his description of Federal Reserve
behavior, I feel Meltzer has provided crucial infor-
mation about the late 1960s. As I have described,
Chairman Martin had fundamentally sensible
views about where inflation came from and the
sustainable level of unemployment. And he did
not change those views during his tenure. Never-
theless, he failed to act to stem the rising infla-
tion of the second half of the 1960s. Meltzer has
provided compelling evidence of Martin’s quite
limited support for true Federal Reserve indepen-
dence and his deference to the White House.
However, my reading of the narrative record
puts less emphasis on the narrow issue of the
Federal Reserve supporting the various adminis-
trations’ fiscal policies and more on supporting
the administrations’ economic frameworks and
macroeconomic goals. In the 1950s, the economic
framework of the Eisenhower administration
largely matched that of Martin and the majority
of the FOMC. In this environment, Martin had
no difficulty standing up to Congress. He said in
1958: “If the System should lose its independence
in the process of fighting for sound money, that
would indeed be a great feather in its cap and ulti-
mately its success would be great” (FOMC, Min-
utes, September 9, 1958, p. 53). But the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations had thoroughly
accepted the New Economics, as had a number of
members of the FOMC and the Board staff. Martin,
I believe, felt it was not appropriate to push his
own views when so many around him believed
otherwise. It is interesting that the minutes of the
FOMC for the 1960s contain numerous discus-
sions of the Council of Economic Advisers’ beliefs
and forecasts (see, for example, February 13, 1962,
p. 5, and March 1, 1966, p. 44).  
I would also put much less weight than
Meltzer does on operating procedures as a source
of Martin’s policy mistakes in the late 1960s.
Short-term emphasis in policymaking, lack of
focus on monetary aggregates, and a commitment
to maintaining interest rates during a Treasury
debt issue were all factors that had been present
in the 1950s. Yet, as Meltzer notes, the Federal
Reserve had no trouble undertaking aggressive
and successful disinflations after the Korean War
and in 1958-59. Furthermore, Meltzer’s argument
that larger budget deficits in the 1960s made
“even-keel” constraints more important seems to
me implausible. The deficit-to-GDP ratio in 1959
was as large or larger than in most years of the
late 1960s and early 1970s. The important change
between the 1950s and the 1960s was the change
in economic beliefs among fiscal and some mone-
tary policymakers, which, for the reasons Meltzer
discusses, Martin chose not to challenge.
While a slightly revised version of Meltzer’s
politics story can explain why Martin did not act
to restrain the rising inflation of the late 1960s,
this, of course, only brings us to 1970. That the
moderate inflation of the late 1960s continued
and accelerated for ten more years is in many ways
the more important feature of the Great Inflation.
I do not believe that the politics hypothesis is
correct for most of this decade. I certainly do not
feel that it is correct for Arthur Burns in the early
1970s. Meltzer quotes Burns’s 1979 Per Jacobson
lecture as evidence that Burns knew that monetary
policy could have stopped the inflation of the
1970s, but felt unable to do so because of political
constraints. I can’t help but believe that there is
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Burns’s ex post account. The minutes of the FOMC
for the early 1970s show no sign of a struggle
between Burns’s desires and the policies he advo-
cated. Burns argued forcefully for expansionary
policy, citing his belief that monetary contraction
was useless. This was, importantly, an idea he had
expressed many times before becoming Federal
Reserve Chairman.
It is possible that political concerns were more
important late in Burns’s tenure. By the mid-1970s,
Burns’s economic framework seemed much more
standard, and he testified that “we will need to
rely principally on sound management of aggre-
gate demand through general monetary and fiscal
policies” to bring about a gradual return to price
stability (Board of Governors, February 1974, p.
105). Nevertheless, after tightening during the
1974 recession and returning the inflation rate to
an almost acceptable level, Burns led a rapid
monetary expansion in 1977. The minutes give
remarkably little justification for this action. I hope
that Meltzer will turn his prodigious talents to
explaining Burns’s puzzling last hurrah.
In the case of G. William Miller, whom Meltzer
does not discuss, I think there can be little doubt
that he was acting as he saw fit. Miller genuinely
believed that it was possible to “pursue a monetary
policy that aims at a reduction of inflationary
pressures while encouraging continued economic
growth and high levels of employment” (Board
of Governors, December 1978, p. 943). Miller, like
Burns, acted in a way that supported the adminis-
tration in office because he shared the same econ-
omic framework as the administration.
One way to try to get some empirical evidence
on the issues that Meltzer raises is to look at the
Federal Reserve’s internal forecasts. Meltzer’s
political story implies that the Federal Reserve
knew better—they understood that their actions
in the late 1960s and early 1970s were inflationary
(or at least not contractionary enough to curb
inflation), but took them for political reasons. If
this were true, one would expect their internal
Romer


























Greenbook Forecast Errors for Inflationforecast errors for inflation to be reasonably small
and unbiased. This is most definitely not the case.
Figure 1 shows the forecast errors for the
Greenbook forecast of inflation two quarters ahead.
(I am using the Greenbook forecast for the GNP/
GDP deflator and therefore use as the comparison
series a real-time measure of the deflator. See
Romer and Romer, 2002b, for more details on the
comparison series and procedures.) The forecast
errors during the Great Inflation were very large
and nearly all positive. Federal Reserve forecasts,
on average, underpredicted inflation just two quar-
ters ahead by 1.2 percentage points. And, during
the early Burns era, forecast errors of 4 percentage
points or larger were common. Such large errors
are more consistent with the notion that the
Federal Reserve failed to curb inflation because
its model of the economy was severely flawed,
than that the Federal Reserve was constrained by
fiscal policy or other political concerns. It is inter-
esting to note that, even during the late Martin
era, the inflation forecasts are severely overly
optimistic, which is perhaps indicative of the
idea that, while Martin may have had reasonable
beliefs, many at the Federal Reserve (including
the staff) had adopted the New Economics. This
may help to explain why Martin found it hard to
follow his personal compass.
Another exercise one can do with the
Greenbook forecasts is to infer the implicit esti-
mate of the natural rate of unemployment. To
do this, one has to make the somewhat heroic
assumption that all forecasted movements in
inflation result from forecasted deviations of
unemployment from the natural rate. Thus, the
estimates will inevitably be somewhat noisy and
rough. (Again, see Romer and Romer, 2002b, for
more details on this exercise.) The results, how-
ever, are striking and are given in Table 2. The
implicit estimate of the natural rate averaged
around 3 percent during the late Martin and early
Burns periods. It rose substantially in the last three
years of Burns’s tenure, a time when his stated
economic views also became more reasonable.
These implicit estimates of the natural rate then
fell to around 4.5 percent during the Miller era.
These estimates (except for those late in the Burns
era) are dramatically lower than almost any mod-
ern estimates of the natural rate for this period
(see Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997) and lower
than the implicit estimates in the Greenbook fore-
casts for the Volcker and Greenspan eras. That the
Federal Reserve’s internal estimates of the natu-
ral rate were so overly optimistic during the late
1960s and much of the 1970s makes it unlikely
that they were chomping at the bit to tighten but
were prevented from doing so by political con-
cerns. Rather, the Federal Reserve was doing what
it thought was right, given the beliefs that it held
at the time.
A final consideration that forces me to ques-
tion Meltzer’s explanation of the Great Inflation
in the United States is the fact that the inflation
of the late 1960s and 1970s was worldwide. As
Figure 2 makes clear, though the inflation may
have started sooner in the United States, by 1970
it had enveloped all of the major industrial coun-
tries. (The data are from Global Financial Data
and show the annual percentage change in the
consumer price index for each country.) A story
that focuses on the delicate relationship between
the Federal Reserve and the executive and legisla-
tive branches or on the particulars of Federal
Reserve operating procedures just seems too small.
One inherently wants an explanation that crosses
borders.
Now, Meltzer is surely right that some of the
worldwide inflation was simply American infla-
tion exported to other countries by the Bretton
Woods system. Countries such as Japan and
Germany were strongly committed to fixed
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 exchange rates. As a result, when American infla-
tion caused large trade surpluses for those coun-
tries, they responded, in part, by allowing inflation
to rise (see, for example, Cargill, Hutchison, and
Ito, 1997, and Johnson, 1998). It is also surely the
case that Meltzer’s politics story is right for some
countries. For example, Fratianni and Spinelli’s
(1997) analysis of Italian monetary history stresses
fiscal dominance and structural rises in the budget
deficit as the key sources of Italy’s unusually
severe inflation in the 1970s. And, in a number
of countries, there was surely at least some of the
pressure toward cooperation with fiscal authorities
that Meltzer thinks was important for the United
States in the late 1960s.
But, for most of the key industrial countries,
ideas played a more central role. Ideas, such as a
belief that very low unemployment was sustain-
able or that inflation caused by supply factors
won’t respond to contractionary monetary policy,
can easily spread across countries. And there is
a growing body of research that suggests that such
ideas fueled the inflation of the late 1960s and
1970s in a number of countries. Nelson (2004a,b),
for example, has shown that policymakers in the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and
Canada all subscribed to the belief that aggregate
demand contraction could do little to cure infla-
tion and so refused to adopt anti-inflationary
monetary or fiscal policy. Johnson (1998) shows
that the tenets of optimistic Keynesianism led
German fiscal authorities to adopt quite expan-
sionary policies between 1969 and 1973 (see also
Kloten, Ketterer, and Vollmer, 1985, and Allen,
1989). And, as Meltzer notes, Germany and Japan
resisted revaluation when the Bretton Woods
system began to falter in the early 1970s because
they feared the output consequences. What, other
than a flawed model of the economy, would have
led these two countries to believe that the over-
heated conditions could have endured and not
given way to rising inflation?
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the Great
Inflation in the United States and elsewhere was
Romer

















Inflation in Five Countriesthe result of ideas is the fact that ideas ended it.
Countries with vastly different institutions, oper-
ating procedures, and fiscal situations success-
fully undertook painful disinflations and have
maintained low inflation in the face of numerous
shocks for almost two decades. One need only
attend a meeting of central bankers to see that what
is consistent across countries is the economic
framework—nearly everyone subscribes to the
fundamental beliefs that inflation is costly, capac-
ity is limited, and inflation can be controlled by
aggregate demand policy. It is these beliefs that
fueled the Volcker disinflation in the United States
and that broke the back of inflation worldwide.
Like all good revolutions, the Volcker revolution
was the triumph of better ideas over worse ones.
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